Chapter 12 - Innovation Law and Policy Choices for Climate Change-Related Public–Private Partnerships by Sarnoff, Joshua D. & Chon, Margaret
Seattle University School of Law 
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
The Cambridge Handbook of Public-Private Partnerships, Intellectual Property Governance, and 
Sustainable Development 
2018 
Chapter 12 - Innovation Law and Policy Choices for Climate 
Change-Related Public–Private Partnerships 
Joshua D. Sarnoff 
Margaret Chon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cambridgehandbook-ppp-ip-
sdg 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua D. Sarnoff & Margaret Chon, Innovation Law and Policy Choices for Climate Change-Related 
Public–Private Partnerships, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 245–288 (Margaret Chon, 
Pedro Roffe, & Ahmed Abdel-Latif eds., 2018). 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by Seattle University School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Cambridge Handbook of Public-Private Partnerships, 
Intellectual Property Governance, and Sustainable Development by an authorized administrator of Seattle University 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
12 Innovation Law and Policy Choices for Climate
Change-Related Public–Private Partnerships
Joshua D. Sarnoff* and Margaret Chon
Introduction
The impacts and costs of climate change will depend substantially upon the rapid
development and widespread dissemination of a wide variety of new climate change
mitigation and adaptation technologies. A staggering range of technologies emit green-
house gases (GHGs) or otherwise have climate effects or, on the other hand, can be
used to accomplish mitigation or adaption goals. For example, one US study identified
hundreds of technologies in various categories, such as “end-use/infrastructure (e.g.
transportation), energy supply (e.g. hydrogen), carbon capture-storage (e.g. geologic
storage), non-CO2 [carbon dioxide] GHGs (e.g. methane from landfills), [and] measur-
ing & monitoring capabilities (e.g. oceanic CO2 sequestration).”1 A European study
identified fifty-one categories of technology, organized by industry sector, or by conser-
vation or pollution reduction goals.2 Many other studies have noted that the need for
patents or other intellectual property (IP) rights – to induce investment and technology
and economic development – may differ dramatically in regard to different kinds of
technologies, industry sectors, users, and innovators.3 Accordingly, the research and
* Some portions of this chapter are drawn from and build upon Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and
Climate Change, 16 Va. J. L. & Tech. 301 (2011) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Patent System]; Joshua D. Sarnoff,
Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change), 62 Emory L. J. 1087
(2013) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Government Choices]; Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Likely Mismatch Between
Federal R&D Funding and Desired Innovation, 18 Vanderbilt J. Enter. & Tech. L. 363 (2016)
[hereinafter Sarnoff, Mismatch]; Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Climate
Change 200–33, 334–51 (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., 2016) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Research Handbook];
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Intellectual Property and Climate Change, with an Emphasis on Patents and Technology
Transfer, in The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law 391–416 (Gray, Kevin R.,
Richard Tarasofsky, & Cinnamon P. Carlarne eds., 2016); Jesse L. Reynolds, Jorge L. Contreras & Joshua
D. Sarnoff, Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual Property: Toward a Research Commons, 18 Minn.
J. L., Sci. & Tech. 1 (2017); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory,
63 Hastings L. J. 53 (2011); Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experi-
mental Use and Research Tools, 48 IDEA 123 (2008); Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher Holman, Recent
Developments Affecting the Enforcement, Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 Berke-
ley Tech. L. J. 1299, 1357 (2008).
1 See, e.g., Thomas L. Brewer, Technology Transfer and Climate Change: International Flows, Barriers, and
Frameworks, in Climate Change, Trade and Competitiveness (Lael Brainerd and Isaac Sorkin eds.)
(citing the US Climate Change Technology Program).
2 Id. (citing the European Commission Environmental Technologies Action Plan).
3 See generally, e.g., Keith E. Maskus & Ruth L. Okediji, Legal and Economic Perspectives on International
Technology Transfer in Environmentally Sound Technologies, in Intellectual Property Rights: Legal
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development (R&D) and IP landscapes for technology transfer regarding climate change
technologies is highly heterogenous.
The Paris Agreement (Paris Agreement)4 of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC)5 obligated significant funding for mitigation and adapta-
tion, which will combine with large potential private markets for mitigation, adaptation,
and infrastructure measures. These funds will attract new technological development.
The Paris Agreement follows the approach to technology R&D6 financing and dissemin-
ation7 through various methods – which may include private market flows – adopted by
the UNFCCC in Cancún in 2010.8
This chapter addresses the choices that government policy-makers and private actors
must and will make within the innovation policy system to fund and develop climate
change-related mitigation and adaptation technologies (whether or not subject to IP
rights) as well as to transfer those technologies around the world to address climate
change-related needs. In this chapter, the term “technology transfer” refers to the many
methods of disseminating climate-change mitigation and adaptation technologies,9 even
though technology transfer in the UNFCCC and in the Paris Agreement, as well as in
some other contexts, may sometimes have a narrower meaning.10
The Paris Agreement placed substantial emphasis on R&D and technology transfer
through private markets, contrary to competing recommendations to rely more on public
funding11 and despite the many government alternatives that exist for funding technology
development and transfer.12 In particular, governments can play an important role in
and Economic Challenges for Development 392 (2014) [hereinafter Maskus & Okediji, Legal and
Economic Perspectives]; Keith Maskus & William Ridley, Intellectual Property-Related Preferential Trade
Agreements and the Composition of Trade (draft of Mar. 17, 2017) (on file with the author); David Autor
et al., Foreign Competition and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from U.S. Patents (NBER Working Paper
No. 22879, Nov. 2016); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W7552, 2000) (empirical analysis of differences between products and processes
and across industries); Korhan Arun & Durmus C. Yildirim, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on
Intellectual Property, Patents and R&D, 7 Queen Mary J. Intell. Prop. 226 (2017); Richard C. Levin
et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 18 Brookings Papers on
Econ. Activity 783 (1987); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine,
79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 467, 478 (2008); Michael W. Carroll, The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 55, 848 (2008).
4 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Draft Decision –/CP.21 Annex (2015), [herein-
after Paris Agreement].
5 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, signed Jun. 1992, entered into force Mar. 21, 1994 [hereafter UNFCCC].
6 R&D is often combined with the term ‘demonstration’ and referred to collectively as ‘RD&D.’ Demonstra-
tion is often necessary after development in order to assure fitness of the technology for desired purposes.
7 ‘Dissemination’ and ‘RD&D’ collectively are sometimes referred to as ‘RDD&D,’ although the term
‘deployment’ is more frequently used in this context than the broader term ‘dissemination.’
8 See UNFCCC (2010), Draft Decision CP.16, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, }} IV.A.98–99 [hereinafter UNFCCC, Cancún
Agreement].
9 See the discussion of the meaning of technology transfer in Part I.A.
10 Paris Agreement, supra note 4 at Annex, Preamble } 3.
11 See, e.g., Gwyn Prins et al., The Hartwell Paper: A New Direction for Climate Policy After the Crash of
2009, 5 (2010). Cf. Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Anis Chowdhury, Krishnan Sharma, & Daniel Platz, Public-
Private Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Fit for Purpose? 6 (U.N. Dept. of
Econ. & Soc. Affairs, DESA Working Paper No. 148, ST/ESA/2016/DWP/148, Feb. 2016) (critically
evaluating “blended finance” in public–private partnerships).
12 See generally Sarnoff, Government Choices, supra note *.
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stimulating innovation and technology transfer. Mechanisms that are available for gov-
ernments to fund, develop, and transfer innovations include public provision of necessary
infrastructure, subsidized research, and prioritized public procurement. All of these options
can substitute for, supplement, or support market-driven intellectual property (IP) rights.
But there are limits to government resources (particularly at local levels), and the public
sector “does not always have the resources required to push through new projects independ-
ent of the IP-related costs involved.”13 Given the political difficulties of committing to
massive expenditures as public obligations, the choice to rely primarily on private markets
and consequent IP rights to generate the bulk of the committed funding for climate
change-related mitigation and adaptation technologies hardly comes as a surprise.
Reliance on private sector development and transfer thus will encourage the acquisi-
tion of IP rights (of differing kinds, to differing degrees, and in various industries) in the
hopes of appropriating greater economic returns. In turn, the costs of climate change
mitigation and adaptation measures will depend in part on whether specific climate
change technologies are subject to IP rights, on how those rights are licensed, and on
what technological substitutes are affordably available.14 For example, widely cited
assessments have assumed there would be price constraints on patented climate change
technologies because of the availability of ready substitutes for existing technologies, or
because of development of incremental rather than breakthrough technologies. But these
assumptions may not always hold,15 as climate technologies are very diverse. These
assumptions are particularly unlikely to be true if we move to novel geoengineering
solutions that have not previously been deployed in markets, such as carbon capture and
sequestration technologies or solar climate engineering methods (which include the use
of aerosols or marine cloud brightening to increase the Earth’s albedo, i.e., reflectivity).16
13 Chatham House Workshop Report, IPRs and the Innovation and Diffusion of Climate Technologies, 3
(2007).
14 See John H. Barton, Intellectual Property And Access To Clean Energy Technologies In Developing
Countries: An Analysis Of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel, And Wind Technologies (2007), International Center
for Trade and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 2, x–xii; John H. Barton, Mitigating Climate
Change Through Technology Transfer: Addressing the Needs of Developing Countries, Chatham House,
Energy, Environment and Development Programme: Programme Paper 08/02, 9–10 (2008); see also
Copenhagen Economics, Are IPRs a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate Change Technologies?, 4 (2009). Cf.
Bronwyn Hall & C. Helmers, The Role of Patent Protection In (Clean/Green) Technologies 7 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 16323 (2010).
15 Maskus & Okediji, Legal and Economic Perspectives, supra note 3; See, e.g., Maria J. Oliva et al., Climate
Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights, International Centre for Trade and Sustain-
able Development 67 (2008); Keith E. Maskus & Ruth Okediji, Intellectual Property Rights and Inter-
national Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Risks, Opportunities and Policy Options,
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 10 (2010) [hereinafter Maskus & Okediji,
Intellectual Property Rights].
16 See generally World Energy Council, World Energy Resources: Carbon Capture and Storage 2016; Jesse
L. Reynolds, Solar Climate Engineering, Law, and Regulation, in The Oxford Handbook on the Law
and Regulation of Technology 799–822 (Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, & Karen Yeung eds.,
2016); Edward A. Parson, Starting the Dialog on Climate Engineering Governance: A World Commission,
Centre for International Governance Innovation. But cf. Jeffrey Rismann & Robbie Orvis, Carbon Capture
and Storage: An Expensive Option for Reducing U.S. CO2 Emissions, Forbes (May 3, 2017). Note that
some cost-effective and efficient geoengineering techniques are very old, and geoengineering approaches
could simply promote natural processes. See, e.g., R.D. Schuiling & Oliver Tickel, Olivine Against Climate
Change and Ocean Acidification, Innovation Concepts (n.d.), available at: http://www.innovationconcepts
.eu/res/literatuurSchuiling/olivineagainstclimatechange23.pdf (last visited June 12, 2018).
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All of these factors take on renewed significance and urgency when considered in light
of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in September 2015 as part
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda).17 SDG 9 commits
member states to “promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innov-
ation,”18 while SDG 13 commits them to “[t]ake urgent action to combat climate change
and its impacts.”19 And as SDG 17 indicates, all of the SDGs are to be implemented
through partnerships comprised of heterogenous institutions – including private sector
partners (whether for profit or nonprofit) that may not be primarily oriented toward
sustainable development.20 The overall global landscape of climate change and of energy
technology innovation and transfer already is populated by public–private partnerships
(PPPs),21 reflecting various forms of ownership of and control over those technologies.22
Many more such partnerships are anticipated to form. In light of this reality, it is
interesting how few extant analyses are available of the likely impact of the increased
private sector involvement in development-oriented efforts addressing climate change
through R&D and technology transfer.23
The emphasis on PPPs to achieve the SDGs, including use of PPPs to address climate
and energy SDGs, requires careful calibration of the many different law and policy
choices.24 This chapter refers to policies underlying climate change-related innovation
laws as “innovation policies.” It refers to governmental and private choices made to
effectuate the laws as well as related administrative or private policies as “innovation
choices.” Both public sector and private sector innovation policies can permit, encour-
age, and/or generate innovation choices, which choices in turn can be exercised by
either or both public sector and private sector partners within particular technology
environments. Critical among the many possible laws and policies shaping innovation
are those that relate to innovation funding choices.
17 U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, Transforming Our
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/
transformingourworld (last visited June 12, 2018).
18 Id., Sustainable Development Goal 9, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg9.
19 Id., Sustainable Development Goal 13, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg13.
20 Id., Sustainable Development Goal 17, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17.
21 Some of these PPPs are analyzed in other chapters in this volume. See Ahmed Abdel-Latif, chapter 11,
supra; Ayşem Mert & Philipp Pattberg, chapter 13, infra.
22 See generallyGeertrui Van Overwalle, Individualism, Collectivism and Openness in Patent Law: Promoting
Access Through Exclusion, in Individualism and Collectiveness in Intellectual Property Law
(Jan Rósen, ed., 2011) (discussing various forms of multiple ownership and various licensing approaches
available for use by those forms).
23 Cf. Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck, Global Governance in the Context of Climate Change: The Challenges of
Increasingly Complex Risk Parameters, 85 Int’l Affairs 1173, 1191–92 (2009).
24 Some have used the term “eco-innovation” to address innovation management within the climate change
technology arena. See, e.g., Cristina Díaz-García, Ángela González-Moreno & Francisco J. Sáez-Martínez,
Eco-Innovation: Insights From a Literature Review, 17 Innovation: Organization & Management 6
(2015), (defining “eco-innovation” as the “production, assimilation or exploitation of a product, production
process, service or management or business method that is novel to the organisation [developing or
adopting it] and which results, throughout its life cycle, in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution
and other negative impacts of resources use [including energy use] compared to relevant alternatives”; also
performing literature review and identifying areas of further research in eco-innovation studies).
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While the objects of “law” and “policy” often result from public sector choices, the
hybrid nature of PPPs25 requires adoption of both public sector and private sector policies
and choices in a wider range of contexts, including in the public or private production of
public goods. For simplicity of exposition, we refer below interchangeably to “innovation
policy choices,” “innovation policies,” and “innovation choices,” although we may
mean in context: (1) choices by government entities to adopt particular laws or policies;
(2) choices by PPPs or private sector entities to adopt particular requirements or pol-
icies; (3) choices made by the relevant public sector, hybrid, or private sector entities
pursuant to those laws, requirements, or policies (e.g., decisions regarding what price to
charge, whether to license exclusively or nonexclusively, and whether to develop technol-
ogy or to allow others to do so); or (4) a combination of these choices.
Innovation policy choices, including government funding choices, are embedded in
the structure and decisions of institutions, including PPPs. Made by the people that
comprise those institutions, such choices are shaped by the networks in which these
institutions are located and by the power arrangements that the institutions reflect.26
Partners within collaborative networks may sometimes seek to achieve different and/or
possibly conflicting innovation goals, rendering particular innovation policy choices
suboptimal or ineffective. Conversely, the institutions may align in ways that cause
particular forms of innovation policy choices, including funding, to be better choices
than alternatives that – all things being equal – otherwise might be considered prefer-
able.27 For all these reasons, collaborative networked institutions, such as development-
oriented PPPs, should coordinate with the overall global governance and policy-making
framework led by decisions of national, state, and local governments, as well as of
intergovernmental organizations (INGOs). Steering by these various public sector part-
ners are more likely to maximize the public goods outputs of PPPs and to better achieve
the SDGs.
Unfortunately, far too little is yet known about the mechanisms by which hybrid
institutions such as PPPs might optimally be structured so as to best encourage the
development and transfer of climate change-related technologies.28 To begin to address
25 Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of Trans-
national Governance?, in Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the
Twenty-First Century 195, 196 (Edgar Grande & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2005) (“Transnational
PPPs . . . [are] institutionalized cooperative relationships between public actors (both governments and
international organizations) and private actors beyond the nation-state for governance purposes. By
governance purposes, we mean the making and implementation of norms and rules for the provision of
goods and services that are considered to be binding by members.”).
26 See, e.g., Walter W. Powell, Jason Owen-Smith, & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Sociology and the Science of
Science Policy, in The Science Of Science Policy: A Handbook 56–57 (Kaye H. Fealing et al. eds.,
2011) (defining “institutions” as “the formal and informal rules and conventions that guide a great deal of
social life,” “networks” as “patterned relationships that connect both individual and organizational
participants in a field,” and “power relations” as “particular, asymmetric forms of network ties”). See
generally Sarnoff, Mismatch, supra note *.
27 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internal-
ism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970, 996–97 (2012) (noting that intellectual property rations access according to
price, whereas “the background allocation of resources may be unjust” and arguing that it is debatable that
efficiency goals should be prioritized over distributive justice, but in any event it has not been shown that
intellectual property approaches and reliance on price is a more efficient innovation strategy).
28 See, e.g., Angela Triguero, Lourdes Moreno-Mondéjar, & Maria A. Davia, Eco-Innovation By Small And
Medium-Sized Firms In Europe: From End-Of-Pipe To Cleaner Technologies, 17 Innovation: Org. &
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this knowledge gap, Part I of this chapter first briefly discusses some of the global
inequalities that likely will result from existing unequal patterns of creation and distribu-
tion of climate change technologies and associated ownership of IP rights. This section
also discusses how the costs of accessing climate change technologies protected by IP
rights may further exacerbate the current unequal impacts and differential climate
change obligations of countries. Without concerted efforts to change existing innovation
laws and policies, including funding choices, the corresponding costs of these impacts
and obligations may impose significant stresses on the IP system, as they have with other
serious global problems such as with access to essential medicines.29
Part II then explains how PPPs pose significant challenges for specific policy choices
regarding innovation funding of climate change technologies and associated IP. To do
so, it first presents a typology of public sector choices in innovation funding, including
decisions to rely on the private sector for funding. This section then explains how these
basic national policies may affect the nature, direction, and roles of PPPs in the climate
change and energy development domains. The policy choices for innovation funding
proposed in this Part are relevant both to increasing domestic innovation capacity for
climate change R&D as well as to technology transfer across jurisdictions.
Part III explains why the geographical imbalances of wealth and innovation capa-
city discussed in Part I may pose serious problems for technology transfer, particularly
when attempting to leverage PPP efforts across jurisdictional borders. It then proposes
three sets of approaches to overcoming innovation, access, and price constraints that
may result from public sector policies that rely primarily on PPPs, on private markets,
and on IP rights to fund the development and transfer of climate change-related
technologies. These approaches include public sector innovation laws and policies
as well as innovation choices made within the private sector (or by governments or
PPPs acting as proprietors).30 Similarly, greater involvement of local actors in adapting
technologies to local conditions will normally be needed for effective and efficient
Mgt. 24 (2015) (finding, for example, that “[n]etwork involvement measured by cooperation with
universities and research agencies is essential in . . . eco-innovation in small firms, but not for mid-sized
firms. With regard to environmental regulation, subsidies are important only for small firms, especially for
the adoption of cleaner technologies. On the contrary side, existing environmental regulation is a key
factor to explain the adoption of cleaner technologies for medium firms but not for smaller ones.”);
Chulhyun Kim and Moon-Soo Kim, Identifying Core Environmental Technologies Through Patent Analy-
sis, 17 Innovation: Org. & Mgt. 139–158 (2015).
29 See Ahmed Abdel-Latif et al., Overcoming the Impasse on Intellectual Property and Climate Change at the
UNFCCC: A Way Forward, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Policy Brief
No. 11 (November 2011).
30 Although some of the proposals are best addressed to developed countries like the United States, others
may be better addressed to developing countries or private sector actors (such as universities), or may
depend on the particular laws and policies in place in those countries. And although these recommenda-
tions are made by two academics located in the United States, we believe they have broader application,
even if they may require tailoring to the conditions and needs of different countries or of particular PPPs or
private sector entities. For example, as discussed in Part III, some countries have legal regimes where
private entities are entitled to take title to patented inventions generated with governmental innovation
funds; other countries may not. Similarly, the ‘international exhaustion’ requirements adopted by various
countries (or regions) may differ. Accordingly, careful thought should be given to modifying these
proposals as appropriate to the context of particular countries and private-sector practices.
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technology transfer, particularly for determining which technologies should be trans-
ferred, modified, or developed.31
The chapter concludes with a renewed call for greater public funding32 and for more
careful management of the innovation policies and innovation choices made in estab-
lishing and operating climate change-related PPPs.
I Climate Change Technology Transfer and Intellectual
Property Inequality
A Climate Change Technology Transfer under the UNFCCC
The amount of greenhouse gases that have been emitted over time and the extent of
climate change impacts they will cause are unequally distributed by country and by levels
of economic development.33 The United States and the European Union alone account
for over 50 percent of the cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) that has
occurred from 1850 to 2011.34 China was the third largest cumulative emitter from
1850 to 2011, and has become the largest worldwide emitter of CO2.
35
In 1992 (and earlier), the United Nations (UN) recognized both these inequalities and
the unequal abilities of countries to address climate change and to finance responses
while simultaneously addressing other social needs. The UNFCCC thus explicitly
adopted the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities” for addressing climate change.36 The UNFCCC imposed obligations for
the countries principally responsible for climate change to transfer funds and technology
to the developing world, and made compliance with UNFCCC mitigation and adapta-
tion goals by developing countries contingent on the fulfillment of those developed
country obligations.
31 Padmashree Gehl Sampath & Pedro Roffe, Unpacking the International Technology Transfer Debate: Fifty
Years and Beyond Research, ICTSD Issue Paper No. 36, 17, 19 (Nov. 2012). (“[T]echnological learning is
domestically induced through a range of proactive policy choices, which are critical to explain the
technological underpinnings of export success stories . . . National capabilities are not simply built on
the basis of R&D and science capacity, but are fostered through linkages of economic and non-economic
agents within the economy. Such a policy framework therefore involves purposive sets of actions by
national governments to promote innovation capacity. These policy actions are aimed at strengthening
linkages and collaborative bonds between a variety of actors and networks in the economy.”)
32 Recent economic scholarship emphasizes the substantial returns to government funding of the innovation
system, not only through direct government funding of both basic and applied research but also through
tax credits for private investments in research and development. See Returns to Federal Investments in the
Innovation System: Proceedings of a Workshop – in Brief, National Academies of Science, Engineer-
ing & Medicine (Oct. 2017).
33 See, e.g., Fifth Assessment Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers, Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) at 14 (2014) (“Regional Key Risks and Potential for Risk Reduction”).
34 See, e.g., Mengpin Ge et al., 6 Graphs Explain the World’s Top 10 Emitters (Cumulative CO2 Emissions
1850–2011), World Resources Institute (2014).
35 See, e.g., id.; see also Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Data, US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) (2016).
36 UNFCCC, supra note 5, Preamble } 6 (“Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for
the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate
international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities and their social and economic conditions”). See, e.g., id. Art. 3.1.
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Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC obligated developed countries to “promote, facilitate,
and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound tech-
nologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to
enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention” designed to mitigate and
adapt to climate change.37 These environmentally sound technologies (ESTs)38 are
therefore central to the obligations under the UNFCCC. Similarly, Article 4.7 of the
UNFCCC provided that:
[t]he extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their com-
mitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to
financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that
economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding
priorities of the developing country Parties.39
The 2015 Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC reiterated the Framework Convention’s
recognition of the inequality of causes, impacts, and obligations regarding climate
change.40 It also reinforced the obligation of developed countries to “provide financial
resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adapta-
tion in continuation of their existing obligations under the [UNFCCC].”41 The parties to
the Paris Agreement agreed to meet voluntarily pledged mitigation goals,42 and for
developed country parties to transfer at least US$100 billion per year until 2025, as well
as to transfer technologies to developing country parties for their mitigation and adapta-
tion activities.43
Notably for purposes of this chapter, the funds committed by countries under the Paris
Agreement will include a mix of private and public sources, and will go to both products
and services in the form of technology transfers. Vast amounts of money, mobilized in
part by the prospect of large commercial markets and prompted in part by governmental
development funding, thus will be spent in the energy, transport, agriculture, forestry,
and other industrial and social sectors. Some of that funding will go toward infrastructure
development.44 Nevertheless, the promised funds under the UNFCCC are substantially
37 UNFCCC, supra note 5, Art. 4.5.
38 The transfer and adaptation of effective technologies to developing countries on a sustainable basis is
necessary to address the adverse affects of climate change. As noted in Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC,
developed countries are required to promote and help finance international technology transfer and access
to environmentlally sound technologies and know-how to enable developing countries to implement the
provisions of the Convention. See Maskus & Okediji, Legal and Economic Perspectives, supra note 3,
at 392.
39 UNFCCC, supra note 5, Art. 4.7.
40 See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, Preamble } 3 (“In pursuit of the objective of the Convention, and being
guided by its principles, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”).
41 Id., at Art. 9.1.
42 See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, Art. 3, Art. 4, }} 2, 3, 8, 11–14, Art. 6, } 1.
43 See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, Arts. 9, 10; Draft Decision –/CP.21, }} 54, 67–68.
44 Cf. Manuel F. Montes, Industrialization, Inequality and Sustainability: What Kinds of Industry Policy
Do We Need?, South Center Policy Brief (Aug. 2017) (discussing postcolonial-era challenges to the SDG
9 commitment to “build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and
foster innovation,” in light of the current structure of United Nations’ development assistance, inter-
national legal structure, and institutions).
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less than the amounts that were thought needed by World Bank estimates in 2009,45 and
by the substantially higher estimates that have been developed since,46 particularly in
light of new information on the rapidly accelerating changes to the climate.47
Technology transfer occurs in many different forms. As a working group of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defined it, technology transfer is:
a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for
mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as
governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and research/ education institutions . . . the broad and inclusive term
‘transfer’ encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology cooperation across and
within countries. It covers technology transfer processes between developed countries,
developing countries, and countries with economies in transition. It comprises the
process of learning to understand, utilize and replicate the technology, including
the capacity to choose and adapt to local conditions and integrate it with indigenous
technologies.48
Since the 2010 Conference of the Parties in Cancún, the UNFCCC has focused its
technology transfer efforts through new subsidiary institutions: the Technology Executive
Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN), and the
Green Climate Fund (GCF).49 The Paris Agreement continues to employ and to rely on
these organs formed under the UNFCCC.50 Some of their mechanisms for facilitating
technology transfer are described in Box 12.1.
45 See World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, World Bank 6–7 (2009)
[hereinafter World Development Report 2010].
46 See United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Adaptation Gap Finance Report 2016, at 3
(May 2016) (needs 2–3 times higher than World Bank estimates of $70–100 billion/year by 2030; 4–5
times higher by 2050).
47 See, e.g., Christiana Figueres et al., Comment: Three Years to Safeguard Our Climate, 546 Nature 593
(Jun. 29, 2017); Earth’s Oceans are Warming 13% Faster Than Thought, and Accelerating, The Guardian
(Mar. 10, 2017).
48 Stephen O. Andersen et al., Technical Summary, in Methodological and Technological Issues in
Technology Transfer: A Special Report of IPCC Working Group III 15–16 (2000).
49 “The TEC consists of 20 technology experts representing both developed and developing countries . . .
The CTCN is hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme in collaboration with the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization, and is supported by 11 partner institutions. The Centre
facilitates a network of national, regional, sectoral and international technology centres, networks, organ-
izations and private sector entities.” UNFCCC, Support for Implementing Climate Technology Activities,
TT:CLEAR, http://unfccc.int/ttclear/support/technology-mechanism.html. The partners include univer-
sities and private foundations. See, e.g., Consortium Partners, CTCN, www.ctc-n.org/about-ctcn/consor
tium-partners (last visited Oct. 10, 2017). The GFC’s role continues to grow as the largest international
climate fund helping developing countries respond to climate change. See GFC in Numbers, Green
Climate Fund, 2017.
50 See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, Art. 10, } 3; id. Draft Decision –/CP.21, }} 55, 59, 64. The TEC and
the CTCN form the Technology Mechanism serving the Paris Agreement; the TEC plays a key role in
supporting countries to identify climate technology policies that help them to achieve the Agreement’s
objectives. The CTCN promotes the accelerated transfer of environmentally sound technologies for
low carbon and climate resilient development at the request of developing countries. See TT:CLEAR,
http://unfccc.int/ttclear/support/technology-mechanism.html.
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Box 12.1. UNFCCC Mechanisms for Facilitating Technology Transfer
The TEC has adopted six principal ‘modalities’ for technology development and transfer51
and has prioritized efforts to perform ‘technology needs assessments’ and to understand better
the barriers to technology transfer.52 Similarly, the CTCN, which is currently being hosted
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),53 has adopted modalities and
procedures in six areas, including facilitating the financing of the activities.54 The GCF, in
turn, has focused so far on developing the mechanisms of funding for mitigation and adaptation
(including technology transfers), and on encouraging a balance of funding for mitigation
and adaptation needs. The GCF established its Secretariat with the UNFCCC and the Global
Environment Facility (GEF),55 created a Financial Intermediary Fund with the World Bank
as interim trustee, and authorized the Republic of Korea to be the more permanent host
for the GCF.56
The UNFCCC as a whole has called for developed countries to expedite their short-term
(‘fast-track’) funding and to scale up their commitments to long-term funding to develop-
ing countries (earlier to US$100 billion by 2020, and in Paris to treat that amount as a
‘floor’ and continue it at least through 2025).57 These funds (even if ultimately provided)
are likely to be much too low to achieve the Paris Agreement’s stated goal of limiting
temperature increases to no more than two-degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels,
much less to achieve the more ambitious one-and-one-half degree Celsius goal in light of
recent acceleration of warming effects.58 The UNFCCC has also called for a “significant
share” of the new multilateral funding for adaptation activities to “flow through” the
GCF, and for developed countries to “channel a substantial share of public funds” to
51 These are “(a) Analysis and synthesis; (b) Policy recommendations; (c) Facilitation and catalysing; (d)
Linkage with other institutional arrangements; (e) Engagement of stakeholders; [and] (f ) Information and
knowledge sharing.” Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban
from 28 November to 11 December 2011: Decision 4/CP.17 Technology Executive Committee – Modalities
and Procedures, UNFCCC, Report No. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 } 4 (a)-(f ) (2011) [hereinafter
UNFCCC, “COP17 Report”].
52 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November to
8 December 2012, UNFCCC, Report No. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.2. } 10, (2012) [hereinafter UNFCCC,
“COP18 Report”].
53 Id., at Decision 14/CP.18, Arrangements to make the Climate Technology Centre and Network Fully
Operational.
54 The other five are: “(a) identifying currently available climate-friendly technologies for mitigation and
adaptation that meet development needs; (b) facilitating the preparation of project proposals for existing
technologies for mitigation and adaptation; (c) facilitating adaptation and deployment of currently
available technologies to meet local needs and circumstances; (d) facilitating research, development and
demonstration of new climate-friendly technologies for mitigation and adaptation; (e) enhancing human
and institutional capacity to manage the technology cycle . . .” See UNFCCC, COP17 Report, supra note
51, at Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on, Long-term Cooperative
Action under the Convention, } 135(a)-(f ).
55 The GEF structure is more complex than the TEC; it includes scientific and technical advisory panels of
“internationally recognized experts in the GEF’s key areas of work . . . [which are] are supported by a global
network of experts and institutions.” Organization, GEF, www.thegef.org/about/organization.
56 See UNFCCC, COP18 Report, supra note 52 at Decision 6/CP.18, Report of the Green Climate Fund to
the Conference of the Parties and Guidance to the Green Climate Fund, preamble and }} 3, 7(b).
57 See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at Draft Decision –/CP.21, } 54.
58 See id., at Art. 2.1(a); US Global Climate Change Research Program, Climate Science Special Report
(CSSR) (Jun. 28, 2017), www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/climate/2017/climate-report-final-draft-clean.pdf.
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such activities.59 The Paris Agreement recognizes the need for developed countries to
“provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both
mitigation and adaptation” and to “take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a
wide variety of sources, instruments, and channels, noting the significant role of public
funds.”60 Significantly, as noted by the TEC in its 2012 Report, “[i]ntellectual property
rights were identified as an area for which more clarity would be needed on their role in
the development and transfer of climate technologies based upon evidence on a case by
case basis.”61 However, the Paris Agreement does not itself mention IP rights.
B Unequal Climate Technology R&D and Patent Ownership
Most new, patented mitigation and adaptation technologies are being invented in a
small group of developed countries (collectively referred to as the “North”) and a few
emerging economy countries – particularly Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Korea,
and Mexico (referred to as the “BRICs-plus” countries), rather than in the developing
world (collectively referred to along with emerging economy countries as the “South”).62
More specifically, the first tier of climate change technology development includes prin-
cipally Japan, Germany, and the United States (the “Big Three”) for a very wide range of
technologies, and the United Kingdom and France for particular sectors such as energy
generation. Through self-conscious planning and large amounts of government funding,
China soon may reach the point of creating “Big Four” status.63 The second tier includes
the BRICS-plus countries, which are preeminent in specific sectors such as cement or
renewable energy technologies.64
59 See UNFCCC, COP18 Report, supra, note 52, at Decision 1/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali
Action Plan, }} 63–68. See also Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Nineteenth Session, Held in
Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013: Decision 3/CP19, Long-term Climate Finance, UNFCCC, Report
No. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 }} 7–9 (2013); Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at Draft Decision –/CP.21,
} 55, 59.
60 Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at Art. 9, }} 1, 3.
61 Report on Activities and Performance of the Technology Executive Committee for 2012, UNFCCC, Report
No. FCCC/SB/2012/2 } 35(g) (2012).
62 See, e.g., Antoine Dechezleprêtre et al., Invention and Transfer of Climate Change Mitigation Technologies
on a Global Scale: A Study Drawing on Patent Data 4 (CERNA, Mines Paris Tech, Agence Française de
Dévelopment, Working Paper, 2008) [hereinafter Dechezleprêtre 2008a], https://sallan.org/pdf-docs/
Dechezlepretre.pdf; Bernice Lee, Ilian Iliev & Felix Preston, A Chatham House Report: Who Owns Our
Low Carbon Future?: Intellectual Property and Energy Technologies, Royal Institute of International Affairs,
viii (2009); UNEP, European Patent Office, (EPO) and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development (ICTSD), Patents and Clean Energy: Bridging the Gap Between Evidence and Policy: Final
report, 9, 30–36 (2010) [hereinafter UNEP/EPO/ICTSD Study]. A recent patent study confirmed these
continuing disparaties between the North and South, as well as found an emphasis on pollution control
rather than energy efficiency technologies. See generally Gemma Durán-Romero & Ana Urraca-Ruiz,
Climate Change and Eco-Innovation. A Patent Data Assessment of Environmentally Sound Technologies,
17 Innovation: Org. & Mgmt. 115 (2015).
63 See generally, Cheung, Tai Ming, et al. (Univ. of Cal. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation),
Planning for Innovation: Understanding China’s Plans for Technological, Energy, Industrial, and Defense
Development (2016).
64 See Dechezleprêtre 2008a, supra note 62, at 3–4; Lee, Iliev & Preston, supra note 62, at viii; UNEP/EPO/
ICTSD Study, supra note 62, at 30–36.
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Between 1978 and 2003, most of the climate change mitigation technologies devel-
oped and patented in thirteen categories – as measured by data from the EP/OECD
World Patent Statistical Database – came from the Big Three, although in two categories
the BRICS-plus countries were increasingly developing patented technologies.65 In
particular, China has been spending extensively on R&D and consequently has been
patenting more.66 From 1998 to 2003, patenting of climate change technologies grew on
average by 9 percent per year overall and 18 percent for emerging economies.67 The Big
Three accounted for roughly 60 to 85 percent of all patented inventions in all categories
measured.68 Japan alone accounted for over 50 percent in three categories.69
These unequally distributed technology developments reflect gains from specialization
that are likely to continue or to heighten existing imbalances of technological sophistica-
tion and wealth accumulation through “clustering” effects.70 “Specialization gains are
seemingly important in climate change innovation,”71 and various countries (particularly
Japan) have a substantial, existing competitive advantage in regard to green technology
development.72 These imbalances in local patenting also may reflect differences in R&D
budgets73 and in the head start that many developed countries already possess in scien-
tific and technological development.
Although it is widely recognized that greater public financing for R&D (particularly
for low-carbon R&D) is needed, it may be difficult to generate the political will to
achieve the needed consistent levels of funding or to raise prices sufficiently on carbon
emissions to induce private R&D.74 This could change quickly, however, with growing
recognition of the rapidly increasing harms and costs of climate change. It is to be hoped
65 See Dechezleprêtre 2008a, supra note 62, at 26.
66 See, e.g., Yahong Li, Imitation to Innovation in China: The Role of Patents in Biotechnology and
Pharmaceutical Industries 70 (2010).
67 See Dechezleprêtre 2008a, supra note 62, at 3–4.
68 See ibid. at 18 & Table 3. See also Antoine Dechezleprêtre et al., Invention and Transfer of Climate
Change-Mitigation Technologies: A Global Analysis, 5 Rev. Envt’l. Econ. Pol’y 109, 115–16 (2011) (Big
Three accounted for 59% of patented worldwide climate mitigation inventions from 2000–2005, and 53%
of high-value inventions).
69 See Dechezleprêtre 2008a, supra note 62, at 16.
70 See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Clusters of Innovation: Regional Foundations of U.S. Competitiveness,
Council on Competitiveness (2001); Jonathan Sallet et al., The Geography of Innovation: The Federal
Government and the Growth of Regional Innovation Clusters, Science Progress 1 (2009).
71 Antoine Dechezleprêtre et al., Invention and Transfer of Climate Change Mitigation Technologies on a
Global Scale: A Study Drawing on Patent Data 4 (CERNA, Mines Paris Tech, Agence Française de
Dévelopment, Working Paper, November 2008).
72 See, e.g., Sam Fankauser et al., Who Will Win the Green Race? In Search of Environmental Competitive-
ness and Innovation, 23 Global Envtl. Change 902, 906 (2013).
73 See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Review of the TRIPS Agreement: Fostering the Transfer of Technology to
Developing Countries, 2 J. World Intel. Prop. 939, 944 (1999).
74 See, e.g. Antoine Dechezleprêtre & D. Popp, Fiscal and Regulatory Instruments for Clean Technology
Development in the European Union, London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Policy Paper, at 10, 18–20
(Jul. 2015) (discussing the “double externality” problem that results in underfunding environmental R&D,
noting that carbon pricing may be too low to induce desired levels of R&D, and that positive spillovers
from clean technologies are sufficiently large to justify greater R&D subsidies); Antoine Dechezleprêtre
et al., Climate Change Policy, Innovation, and Growth, London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., (2016) at
9–19 (discussing competitiveness advantages and R&D funding for clean technology spillovers).
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that Paris Agreement efforts through the TEC and GCF will more rapidly generate
greater and more widespread international support for increased public R&D financing.
The principal emphasis on private markets and patent rights to develop needed climate
change technologies will likely generate substantial trade tensions. These will arise as IP
protected goods flow from the North to the South, while revenues from the sale of those
technologies may flow in the opposite direction.75 The costs of such technology transfers
thus will result in significant wealth transfers that will run against the flow of the
UNFCCC’s technology transfer and financing obligations based on “common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” As in areas outside of climate
change technologies, the geographic imbalances in patenting behaviors are likely to
further exacerbate existing IP, trade, and scientific differences, as well as to generate
political tensions along the North–South divide. Further, the reliance principally by the
North on private funding, private markets, and the patent system, and the varying benefits
of the patent system for the wide range of technologies and markets in the South,76 may
pose additional challenges to technology transfer.77 These patterns in the transfer of
climate change technology are a familiar, if more recent, example of a long history
regarding technology transfer between the North and South more generally.78
This is the background against which PPPs have been proposed as a principal means
of implementation for the SDGs, which specifically include combatting climate change
under SDG 13. The next section explores a particularly important subset of public and
private innovation policy choices, i.e., innovation funding mechanisms, that will be used
to address climate change-related technology development and transfer.79
II Innovation Funding Policies and Choices for Climate
Change-Technology Development and Transfer
A Sustainable Development via PPPs Raises New Questions about
the Funding Structure of Climate Change-Related Technology
Development and Transfer
The Paris Agreement supplements the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
to make even clearer the link between sustainable development and environmental
protection in regard to climate change. Specifically, the Agreement’s objectives for
mitigation, adaptation, and financing efforts (and, implicitly, for technology transfer)
make this link explicit. It is worth repeating the language here:
75 See generally David A. Gantz & Padideh Ala’i, Climate Change Innovation, Products and Services Under
the GATT/WTO System, in Sarnoff, Research Handbook, supra n. * at 271; WTO & United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), Trade and Climate Change WTO-UNEP Report (2009).
76 See, e.g., Ricardo Cavazos & Douglas Lippoldt, The Strengthening of IPR Protection: Policy Complements,
2 W.I.P.O. J. 99, 101–2, 110–12 (2010).
77 See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 1, at 3–5.
78 Sampath & Roffe, supra note 31.
79 The following section is largely taken from International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond
Technology Transfer: Protecting Human Rights in a Climate-Constrained World, in Sarnoff, Research
Handbook, supra note *, at 126.
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This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its
objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in
the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:
(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 C above
pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to
1.5 C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce
the risks and impacts of climate change;
(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster
climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that
does not threaten food production;
(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas
emissions and climate-resilient development.80
As stated earlier, many different climate change and energy technologies potentially
fall within the scope of achieving such sustainable development efforts for climate
change mitigation and adaptation. Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC and Paragraph 68(d) of
the Paris Agreement encourage such technologies for adaptation to be “environmentally
sound.”81 This concern is necessarily of a different kind than same requirement for
“environmentally sound” technologies (ESTs) with regard to mitigation technologies.
Whereas mitigation technologies must necessarily aim at an ideal horizon of carbon
neutrality, ESTs for adaptation must aim at global benchmarks recognizing local vari-
ations of development and of need. Adaptation technologies must reflect best available
environmental standards in current use, given costs, resources, and the urgency of
adaptation. Thus, it is critically important to examine how government funding tradition-
ally has operated in technology transfer generally, and how different funding and
coordination approaches might impact the direction of PPPs engaged in climate change
and energy innovation and technology transfer.
B Taxonomy of Government Innovation Funding Mechanisms and Their
Relationship to PPPs
PPPs by definition involve some degree of public sector involvement, including possible
funding, policy-making, steering and operational control, and oversight.82 But very little
analytic work has been done to elucidate the various specific mechanisms of government
involvement in and governance of PPPs.83 This is especially true of innovation policy
80 Paris Agreement, supra note 4, Art. 2.1(a) (emphasis added).
81 UNFCCC, supra note 5, Art. 4.5 (“The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in
Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or
access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing
country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention.”); Paris Agreement, supra
note 4, at }68(d) (“The enhancement of enabling environments for and the addressing of barriers to the
development and transfer of socially and environmentally sound technologies”).
82 This section is substantially condensed from the Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices, supra note *. For
a more detailed analysis, please refer to that discussion.
83 A notable exception is the historic and developing literature on “commons” institutions that are PPPs. See,
e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, 1990); Governing Knowledge Com-
mons (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) [hereinafter
Governing Knowledge Commons].
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choices involving funding choices for technology innovation funding and transfer. Using
a broad brush for classification, government choices to fund innovation can be grouped
into five categories: (1) subsidization; (2) procurement; (3) direct development; (4)
constructed commons; and (5) product, process, and market regulation (which affect
the flows of private funding to and within markets).84 There is no magic to this proposed
classification; different categories are reasonable to employ, particularly as some of the
contents of the categories may overlap.85 The five categories listed above reflect five
fundamentally different approaches to funding innovation. Some of these categories may
have more obvious impact than others on technology innovation and transfer within
PPPs. But all are discussed briefly below.
1 Subsidies
Subsidization is a very broad class that has different comparative effects on innovation.86
The most basic form of subsidy to R&D and innovation is (1) direct and targeted
subsidization of R&D and innovation efforts, such as government agency funding of
university, corporate, or small business R&D, and government support for education
more broadly.87 Other subsidies include: (2) prizes, rewards, and other ex post develop-
ment funding; (3) consumption or production subsidies; (4) tax subsidies; (5) adminis-
trative subsidies; and (6) foreign aid.
The choices that government can make among the various kinds of subsidies should
depend on the degree to which the innovation outputs can reliably be predicted; the
commercial nature of the research; and the comparative effectiveness of government
administrators and firm actors in making predictions, directing the R&D and generating
innovation outputs.88 It will also depend in part on World Trade Organization (WTO)
R&D subsidy disciplines.89 Targeted R&D tax subsidies (and the ex ante incentives they
generate) are useful principally for profit-making ventures, and they will leave control of
84 See Michael Madison, Brett M. Frischmann, & Katherine Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the
Cultural Environment, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 657, 667 (2010); Tuomas Takalo, Rationales and Instruments
for Public Innovation Policies, Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, Paper No. 1, 10–19 (2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2217502; Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit
All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1361, 1368 (2009); Brett
Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy,
24 Vt. L. Rev. 347, 354, 374 n.102, 387 (2000) [hereinafter Frischmann, Innovation]; William Fisher,
Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical Perspectives, 37 Industrial
Property, Innovation, and the Knowledge-based Economy, Beleidsstudies Technologie Economie,
2–3 (on-line version 2001), cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf.
85 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lecture, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 Duke L. J. 1693,
1722 (2008) (employing a different, three-part classification – patents, prizes, and government-funded
research – and focusing on six attributes of these choices: selection of research targets; financing methods;
dissemination incentives; nature of the risks; innovation incentives; and transaction costs).
86 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, National Systems for Financing Innov-
ation, 11–12 (1995).
87 See Frischmann, Innovation, supra note 84, at 387.
88 See id. at 352–3; Henrik Kristensen et al., Adopting Eco-Innovation in Danish Polymer Industry Working
with Nanotechnology: Drivers, Barriers and Future Strategies, 6Nanotech. L. & Bus. 416, 433 (2009). See
also Frischmann, Innovation, supra note 84, at 392.
89 Keith Maskus, Research and Development Subsidies: A Need for WTO Disciplines? E15 Initiative,
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum
(2015), http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/E15_Subsidies_Maskus_final.pdf.
Innovation Law and Policy Choices for Climate Change-Related PPPs 259
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316809587.015
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Seattle University Library, on 03 Mar 2019 at 17:58:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
innovation development to such firms, which often is (debatably) argued to be better
than having the government direct which innovations to target.90
But such simple insights do not get us very far because other forms of subsidies are
available that could potentially induce more effective and efficient R&D and innovation
development in the private sector. Such alternative subsidies include funds provided to
universities and nonprofit research centers, or development through resources provided
by private foundations. There are simply too many potentially effective alternative subsidy
mechanisms to choose from91 with too little analysis of the relative institutional compe-
tencies of the various actors, including government bureaucrats and the decision-making
processes that they follow.92 Different kinds of subsidies are illustrated by many of the
other chapters in this book discussing the operation of PPPs in the global health sector.93
2 Procurement
Procurement resembles R&D innovation subsidies, but it typically provides incentives by
conditioning funding on achieving innovation outputs that are commercial or non-
commercial products. Although there is no theoretically necessary relationship between
government procurement and the creation of IP rights, the US Bayh-Dole Act (under
which private recipients of government funding may acquire patent title to inventions
developed with that funding) applies to US Government procurement contracts ‘for the
performance of experimental, developmental, or research work funded in whole or in
part by the Federal Government’ as well as to grants.94
The effects of procurement on innovation depend partly on whether the contracts take
the form of ‘push’ or ‘pull’ mechanisms with regard to existing or future markets. Push
mechanisms (ex ante market procurement) provide a demonstration of technology and a
stimulus to market development so that industry may subsequently be more willing to risk
market entry.95 Push mechanisms raise questions as to the size of the government sector
and its adequacy to demonstrate commercial viability in a broader market without
government subsidies to production or consumption. Regulation of market prices for
innovation outputs (or rate-based returns to regulated industries, as in the electric utility
sector) further complicates the evaluation of the inducement effectiveness and adequacy
of innovation returns to procurement funding.96
Pull mechanisms (ex post market procurement) provide ex ante innovation incentives
based on assurances of ex post (relative to the time of creating innovations) procurement
90 See Frischmann, Innovation, supra note 84, at 352–53.
91 Id. at 392–95.
92 See Tomain at 404–16; Mark Radka, Some Perspectives About the Climate Technology Centre/Climate
Technology Network, U.N. Environment Programme 101 (2012), http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_
working_groups/lca/application/pdf/some_perspectives_about_the_ctc_ctn.pdf.
93 See chapters in this book by Frederick M. Abbott, chapter 2, supra; Anatole Krattiger et al., chapter 3,
supra; Katy M. Graef et al., chapter 4, supra; Esteban Burrone, chapter 5, supra; Hilde Stevens et al.,
chapter 6, supra.
94 Patent Rights in Inventions Made With Federal Assistance: Definitions, 35 U.S.C. §201(b) (2006).
95 See, e.g., Vernon W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and
Technology Development 108–09 (2006).
96 See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in Handbook of
Industrial Organization 1464–77 (1989); C.O. Ruggles, Problems of Public-Utility Rate Regulation
and Fair Return, 32 J. Pol. Econ. 543, 543–58 (1924).
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funding and adequacy of scale for commercialization, which again reduces market entry
risks. These ex post assurances of procurement (such as advanced purchase commitment
contracts) are, effectively, ex post innovation consumption subsidies, where the govern-
ment acts as a consumer on behalf of itself or of the general public. However, the price
terms of these ex post innovation contracts may be highly uncertain. They also may be
subject to statutory and ‘march-in’ rights regarding patented innovation outputs and to
other contractually retained rights of the government or PPP procuring entity. Often in
PPPs, the scope of the market purchase guarantees, conditions on market behavior,
pricing terms and treatment of developed (foreground) IP, and retained ownership rights
are negotiated in advance.97
Examples of procurement strategies by PPPs abound in the global health area, for
example, the GAVI and other PPPs that work with advance commitments.98
3 Direct Development
Governments directly engage in all sorts of R&D and innovation development, funded
through general or specific taxes and other sources of revenue. This reflects that govern-
ment employees are user-innovators, that government agencies engage in R&D to
generate different kinds of innovation outputs in the course of conducting their statutory
mandates, and that government sometimes creates specialized bureaucracies to perform
R&D and to generate innovation in particular sectors. The most well-known of these
specialized R&D bureaucracies are the national laboratories.
US government policy permits cooperative R&D agreements (CRADAs) with private
entities.99 This allows for greater leveraging of federal funding for particular forms of
innovation conducted within the government. Further, private entities may manage
government research bureaucracies, such as the National Renewable Energy Labora-
tory (NREL) of the US Department of Energy – originally, the Solar Energy Research
Institute – thereby blurring the line between the public and private sectors.100 Additionally,
government can collaborate among its own agencies,101 with subsidiary or foreign govern-
ments, or with INGOs through interpersonnel agreements102 and other collaborative
efforts and personnel exchanges.103 Government also can engage in collaborative R&D
efforts, thereby pooling funds, technology, and other resources like in joint-venturing.
97 See Ron Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property II: A New Innovation Index for Pharmaceutical
Patents & Products, 28 Santa Clara Comp. & High Tech. L.J. 287, 382 (2011).
98 See Frederick M. Abbott, chapter 2, supra.
99 See Federal Technology Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 3710 §12(d)(1) (1986); Matthew Rimmer, Intellec-
tual Property and Climate Change: Inventing Clean Technologies 276–77 (2001).
100 See, e.g., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Batelle, www.battelle.org/our-work/laboratory-man
agement/national-renewable-energy-laboratory.
101 See, e.g., OMB 2013 Budget Report, at 369 (Apr. 29, 2013).
102 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–648, 84 Stat. 1909 (1971) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §4701 et seq. (2006)).
103 See, e.g., US Department of State, Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate
Change, Energy and Environment Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China (Jul. 2009), https://2009–2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/
july/126592.htm; US Department of State, Memorandum of Understanding Signed Between the Gov-
ernment of India and the Government of the United States, (Nov. 30, 2009), https://2009–2017.state.gov/
p/sca/rls/press/2009/132776.htm.
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Government direct development thus may lead to the generation of government-
owned IP rights. For example, NREL possesses a significant portfolio of patents on wind
turbines, generators, power systems, cooling towers, biofuels, and geothermal technolo-
gies and building construction. NREL has also developed an online database – the
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technology Portal – to license its rights.104
Depending on how they are exercised, these government-owned IP rights may have
further effects on domestic and foreign markets and trade flows.105 Whether and how the
government chooses to license its IP rights for further R&D or innovation then becomes
an important issue, as the government may choose to compete with the private sector in
the market (although it rarely does). Even if the government does not directly compete
with the private sector and supplies only to the government sector, government devel-
opment and supply can lead to price reductions in the commercial market through
competitive development. Furthermore, government direct development may impact
private market shares that would be smaller without the inclusion of the government
sector, allowing private entities to better recoup their innovation investments.
4 Constructed Commons
Yet another form of government innovation funding relates to the creation of various
kinds of commons for managing physical or information resources to induce innov-
ation.106 The most obvious form of commons is government-created or government-
subsidized physical infrastructure, such as the highway system or the Internet.107 But
commons in information also may be constructed, subsidized, or regulated by govern-
ment. For example, the World Meteorological Organization – a United Nations special-
ized agency – and others sponsor and make available data on polar climate conditions
that are generated and submitted by both governments and private sector scientists.108
Another example, the Conservation Commons, is a cooperative effort of INGOs, non-
governmental organizations, governments, academic institutions, and entities from the
private sector. The Conservation Commons supports open access to data and sharing
(with attribution) of information regarding biodiversity.109 The US Government’s Global
Positioning Satellite (GPS) signals are freely available from the military and NASA,
following an international incident after which NASA concluded that the public
104 Rimmer, supra note 99, at 290–91.
105 Id. at 266 (citing Daniel Roth, The Radical Pragmatist, Wired, 104, 108 (2010)).
106 SeeMichael W. Carroll, Copyright, Fair Use, and Creative Commons Licenses, in Risk and Entrepreneur-
ship in Libraries: Seizing Opportunities for Change 18 (Pamela Bluh & Cindy Hepfer eds., 2009);
Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg, supra note 84, at 681–82.
107 See Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastucture: The Social Value of Shared Resources 5–6 (2012); Brett
M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 Minn. L. Rev.
917, 923–24, 956 (2005) [hereinafter cited as Frischmann, An Economic Theory]; Gregory N. Mandel,
When to Open Infrastructure Access, 35 Ecology L. Q. 205, 208–10 (2008); Konstantinos Styianou, An
Innovation-Centric Approach of Telecommunications Infrastructure Regulation, 16 Va. J.L. & Tech. 221,
231–40 (2011).
108 See Welcome to the Polar Information Commons (PIC), Polar Information Commons, www.polar
commons.org/.
109 See, e.g., Conservation Commons, ConserveOnline, http://conserveonline.org/workspaces/commons/.
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benefits of new, nonmilitary, and nonaviation uses of the data justified continuing to
provide it free of cost.110
Governments also may subsidize and regulate private sector commons institutions
regarding prices of inputs and outputs, access and other terms of interaction, and may
choose to limit the application of competition law and policy to facilitate commons
development.111 Similar to government direct development, government-commons
approaches may supplement or compete with the private sector with regard to innovation
promotion. For example, governments may affect commons-based activities by requiring
or encouraging the pooling of technology or IP rights;112 providing or supporting free or
low-cost access to information outputs that are R&D or innovation inputs;113 and
engaging in or encouraging interpersonal exchanges.114 If technology- or patent-pooling
occurs, significant competition regulation issues will arise.
Similarly, public-sourced or public-sponsored commons may compete with private
efforts to create commons, whether through the creation of technology or IP pools or
databases, or through the encouragement of liberal licensing policies.115 However,
government-constructed and government-managed commons do not normally or pur-
posefully compete with private R&D or innovation activity in research or production
markets, even if they generate information outputs that are inputs to further R&D or
innovation. Rather, such public commons typically seek to facilitate public or private
R&D and innovation by lowering investment costs through creating infrastructure or
other forms of commons resources, and by pooling expertise and information that
otherwise might not as readily be compiled. Such public commons thus typically supple-
ment other forms of government sponsorship of public and private R&D and innovation,
rather than substitute for them. Longtime expert observers have recently proposed such a
data commons and an IP pledging community for solar climate engineering research and
technological developments.116
110 See James Love & Tim Hubbard, Paying for Public Goods, in Code: Collaborative Ownership and
the Digital Economy 207, 208–09 (James Love, Tim Hubbard, & Rishab Aiyer Ghosh eds., 2005).
111 See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 Yale
J. Reg. 135, 164–75 (2008); Michael Madison, Brett M. Frischmann, & Katherine Strandburg, The
University as Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 365, 375–76 (2009). See
generally Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (2006).
112 See Dustin Szakalski, Progress in the Aircraft Industry and the Role of Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing
Agreements, 15 UCLA J. L. & Tech. 1 (2011); Harry Dykman, Patent Licensing Within the Manufactur-
er’s Aircraft Association (MAA), 46 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 646 (1964); Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 888–90 (1990).
113 See, e.g., US Department Energy Off. Sci., Human Genome Project Information (2011), www.ornl.gov/
sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml; International HapMap Project (2011), http://hapmap
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov; Technology Mechanism, UNFCCC (2013), http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/
render_cms_page?TEM_home.
114 See, e.g., US Dept. of Energy, DOE/NNSA Overseas Presence Advisory Board’s Overseas Corps Training
Program Agreement, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOE-Overseas-Corps-Training-Program.pdf.
115 See Green Exchange (2012), http://www.greenexchange.com; Wayne Balta,Welcome to the Eco-Patent
Commons, CEF EcoInnovator Blog, www.corporateecoforum.com/welcome-to-the-eco-patent-com
mons/; Welcome to PLOS, Public Library of Science, www.plos.org; Creative Commons, Science,
https://creativecommons.org/about/program-areas/open-science; R. Kunstadt & I. Maggioni, A Proposed
“U.S. Public Patent Pool,” Les Nouvelles, 10–13 (2011).
116 Reynolds, Contreras, & Sarnoff, supra note *.
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5 Market Regulation
The fifth and final mechanism of government innovation funding is market regulation,
which is also a very broad category. Regulation covers: (a) direct product and process
regulation; (b) information reporting and government disclosures, which may also lead to
(or induce private action to avoid) direct product and process regulation;117 (c) recogni-
tion and certification programs,118 the premises of which are to provide incentives to
direct private actions and to convey a market advantage that induces directed consump-
tion patterns and thus greater innovation;119 and (d) a wide variety of market-structure
and market-operation regulations, including market-entry, price, competition, and IP
rights regulations. All of these may affect innovation incentives by governing market-
based returns of PPPs. Of these various forms of market regulation, this section focuses
on IP and antitrust (competition) laws. It contextualizes the innovation policy choices
within larger debates about the global IP legal regime and related global governance of
climate change technologies.
In considering direct regulation by governments of market structures and opera-
tions, both IP and competition laws are the most obvious places to look (although price
controls, crown use, statutory and compulsory licensing, and other forms of regulation
of private market returns relating to technological products and services also may be
used).120 IP rights may be viewed as a form of market regulation, although they also
provide a government subsidy (a property right), given that the exclusive right regulates
market behaviors through government regulatory clearances and litigation mechanisms
(which can include actions brought by the government).121 Further, even when viewed
as subsidies, IP rights are subject to IP and competition law doctrines that regulate how
such rights relate to and are used in markets, whether such rights are considered to be
property rights or to be regulatory rights, or a combination of both.122
The optimal strength, scope, and duration of IP rights that governments may grant
depend on multiple, competing considerations. These include the following eight con-
cerns: (a) private reliance on IP rights as a means of recouping investments in innovation,
combined with government market regulation of the returns on such investments;123
117 See Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Informational Approaches to Regulation 4–5 (1992).
118 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Climate Leadership Awards, www.epa.gov/climateleadership/awards/index.html;
Margaret Chon, Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: Brands and Innovations in Corporate Social
Responsibility, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 277 (2017).
119 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Energy Star® – The Power to Protect the Environment Through Energy Efficiency,
EPA 430-R-03–008, 2–3 (2003).
120 See, e.g., Lionel Nesta, Francesco Vona, & Francesco Nicolli, Environmental Policies, Product Market
Regulation and Innovation in Renewable Energy (2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192441. See generally, B. Zorina Khan, Antitrust and Innovation
Before the Sherman Act, 77 Antitrust L.J. 757, 759–60, 784–5 (2011).
121 See, e.g., Criminal Offenses, 17 U.S.C. §506(a) (2006); Criminal Infringement of a Copyright, 18 U.S.C.
§2319(a) (2006).
122 See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S.Ct. 1365 (2018) (holding
that patents are “public franchises” even if they are private property, and thus fall under the “public rights”
doctrine).
123 See generally Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 2; Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of
Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 Handbook of Industrial Organization 1059 (Richard Schma-
lensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Firm Size & R&D Intensity: A Re-
Examination, 35 J. Industrial Econ. 543, 548–49 (1987).
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(b) public funding of inputs to private research and development; (c) values of private
researchers (or their firms) regarding the public’s interests; (d) the pioneering or
cumulative nature of the research; (e) the degree of centralization of firm structures;
(f ) dependence on IP for funding of R&D or firm ventures; (g) documentation and
publication practices that make it harder to build on others’ work or to avoid infringe-
ment or clear rights; and (h) various types of network externalities.124 Unfortunately,
economic and theoretical analyses of direct measures to restrict static social welfare losses
of granting property rights in intellectual productions, and of efforts to balance those
losses against dynamic innovation-incentive losses – such as price controls or compulsory
licensing – have proven theoretically intractable.125 As remains true more than a decade
after it was said, ‘[e]fforts to identify an optimal balance of these various effects continue,
but no solution is yet in sight’.126
Antitrust analyses reflect similar theoretical and empirical limitations. Much has been
written about differences of innovation and product markets and the need to differentiate
antitrust and IP doctrines as a result of different market structures and dynamics for
different products and timeframes.127 Innovation market concerns reflect the insight ‘that
a merger between the only two, or two of a few, firms in R&D might increase the
incentive to suppress at least one of the research paths.’128 As a recent criticism of even a
limited discussion of innovation markets has stated, the ‘fundamental flaws in the
innovation market concept are . . . [that we] don’t know about the relationship between
market structure and effect, that error costs are high, and that competition is multidimen-
sional. In other words, we don’t know a lot and acting on our ignorance . . . is costly.’129
As stated earlier, many people and institutions have recognized the unequal technol-
ogy transfer framework for climate change and energy innovation. To address these
concerns, numerous changes, some highly controversial, have been proposed to the
global patent regime.130 These include: broad, categorical exclusions of environmentally
sound or climate friendly technologies from the patent system; and regulation of licens-
ing and market behaviors, including compulsory licensing, antitrust scrutiny, and price
controls.131 These direct means of regulating prices and competition will remain legally
124 See Fisher, supra note 84, at 17–18, 24–25.
125 See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, Winter 1991 J. Econ. Persp. 33–35 (2009); Rudolph J. R. Peritz, Competition Within Intellectual
Property Regimes: The Instance of Patent Rights, in Intellectual Property and Competition Law:
New Frontiers 27 (Steven Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).
126 Fisher, supra note 124, at 9.
127 See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and
Intellectual Property, 53 Antitrust L. J. 503, 514–18 (1984); J. Thomas Rosch, Antitrust Regulation of
Innovation Markets: Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Intellectual Property Conference, (2009). See generally
Jonathan Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 Yale L. J.
384 (2009); Mark Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.
637 (2011).
128 Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual
Property and Antitrust Law 297 (2009).
129 Geoffrey Manne, Assuming More Than We Know About Innovation Markets: A Review of Michael
Carrier’s Innovation in the 21st Century, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 553, 555 (2010). But cf. Michael Carrier,
Innovation for the 21st Century: A Response to Seven Critics, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 597, 601–3 (2010).
130 Abdel-Latif, et al., supra note 29.
131 See, e.g., K. Ravi Srinivas, Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights,
Research and Information System for Developing Countries, Discussion Paper No. 153, 26–7 (2009),
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available to governments that hope to induce – but may be forced to compel – more
favorable licensing and pricing practices than would voluntarily occur.132
Although further amendment of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement) – as has been discussed by the United Nations
Secretariat133 – is a theoretical possibility, consensus for adopting amendments in the
short term is highly unlikely. Without such treaty amendments, countries (particularly
those in the developing South) may seek to make greater use of existing TRIPS Agree-
ment flexibilities to tailor their patent doctrines to assure access and to lower costs. They
may adopt exclusions from patent eligibility, exceptions to patent rights, and alternatives
to private licensing (such as a global technology pool). They also may expand access to
publicly funded technologies to better promote technology development, transfer, and
use.134 These options may provide greater ex ante predictability “in accessing technolo-
gies and [may] further enable much-needed research and development for local adapta-
tion and dissemination, which would further reduce the cost of the technologies.”135
Governments addressing private refusals to license patented technologies or high
prices for access to those technologies may regulate such conduct directly, by adopting
compulsory licenses or by imposing price control regulations.136 Alternatively, they may
regulate such conduct indirectly, by treating restrictive or costly licensing as a competi-
tion violation (for example, as an abuse of dominant position) or by treating the patents
themselves as essential facilities (that is, as products or services that are considered com-
petitive necessities and for which access also can be required by compulsory licenses).137
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440742; Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property
in International Perspective: Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium, 48 Hous.
L. Rev. 1137–8 (2009) [hereinafter Reichman, International Perspectives]; Peter Lee, Toward a Distri-
butive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 974–6 (2009); Estelle Derclaye, Not Only Innovation
But Also Collaboration, Funding, Goodwill and Commitment: Which Role for Patent Laws in Post-
Copenhagen Climate Change Action, 9 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 663 (2010).
132 Concerns over IP rights and climate change technologies have already caused significant political
tensions. At an earlier stage of international negotiations, the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-term Cooperative Action (WG-LCA) considered various proposals that had been suggested by some
countries in the South. These measures would have placed significant restrictions on the traditional
operation of the patent system. The measures ranged from requiring patent pooling and royalty free
compulsory licensing to excluding green technologies entirely from patenting – even retroactively
revoking existing patent rights. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under
the Convention, Ideas and proposals on the elements contained in paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan,
23 UNFCCC (2009); Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Conven-
tion, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention on
its Seventh Session, UNFCCC Doc. No. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/14, 156 (2009).
133 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (April 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Result of the
Uruguay Rounds 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. See, e.g., World Economic and
Social Survey 2009, U. N. Dept. of Econ. and Soc. Affairs 133–34 (2009).
134 See World Economic and Social Survey 2010, U. N. Dept. of Econ. and Soc. Affairs 97 (2010).
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, The Curious Economics of Parallel Imports, 2 W.I.P.O. J. 123–4 (2010)
[hereinafter Maskus, Parallel Imports].
137 See, e.g., Jay P. Choi, Compulsory Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy, 2 W.I.P.O. J. 74, 74–77 (2010).
European Commission Dec. of 13 May 2009, COMP/37.990 (Intel) }} 1749–53, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37990/37990_3581_11.pdf. But see Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
407–08 (2004).
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Such direct or indirect regulation, moreover, may be largely ineffective in regard to
assuring transfers of tacit knowledge.138
Both direct and indirect approaches to regulating access and prices will be highly
controversial, and may threaten substantial trade retaliation or may prompt withholding
by businesses of technology and foreign investment. Compulsory licensing, price regula-
tion, and antitrust treatment have been repeatedly resisted by the United States and
(somewhat less so) by other developed countries, particularly in foreign markets where
the countries do not bear the costs but reap the benefits of technology exports.139 The
developing South may be unwilling to resist such trade pressures, even if the threats and
trade sanctions would be found illegal under WTO rules.140 These legal and political
constraints bring us to proposals discussed in the next Part of this chapter, which
emphasize private sector, voluntary initiatives to increase access and technology transfer,
within a context of public sector laws and policies that promote innovation and access.
III Key Innovation Policy Choices in Climate Change
Technology Transfer
In contrast to the comparative advantages that would lead to further extending the
developed North’s innovation and patenting head start, international action on climate
change may help to narrow the gap either through cooperative trade measures like trade-
tariff exemptions or through cooperative technology development efforts, such as multi-
national joint ventures or joint manufacturing for particular climate change technolo-
gies.141 Similarly, international efforts may transfer technology directly to developing
countries, through foreign-funded, in-country R&D, through joint ventures, and through
foreign direct investment in R&D.142 However, many obstacles exist to such foreign-
funded or participatory R&D efforts that rely principally on market-based approaches –
including significant fears of loss of control over technologies protected by patents and
trade secrets, given the perceived lack of adequate enforcement of patent and trade secret
rights in developing countries.143 This Part first discusses some of the challenges to
technology transfer given the global imbalances discussed in Part I and additional
concerns specific to climate change technology transfer, then proposes six innovation
policy choices that could help to mobilize R&D and to transfer technology more
effectively.
138 See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 253–57 (2009).
139 Cf. id. at 255.
140 See, e.g., id. at 258–59.
141 See, e.g., Lee, Iliev, & Preston, supra note 62, at xi; UNEP/EPO/ICTSD Study, supra note 62, at 21–23;
Robert Fair, Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory Licensing of Green Technology, 6 B.Y.U. Int’l
L. & Mgmt. Rev. 21, 40–41 (2009).
142 See, e.g., Lee, Iliev, & Preston, supra note 62, at ix-x, 58; Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Policy, Intellecutal
Property, and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change, 18 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 69,
86 (2009).
143 See, e.g., Lee, Iliev & Preston, supra note 62, at 8; Daniel Johnson & Kristina Lybecker, Challenges to
Technology Transfer: A Literature Review of the Constraints on Environmental Technology Dissemination
(2009). See generally Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 W.I.P.O. J. 1 (2010).
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A Geographic Imbalances in Technology Transfer to, and Costs of Access in,
the Developing South
Technology transfer typically occurs through trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), joint
venturing, or licensing.144 Although some studies suggest that licensing and FDI (and
consequently technology transfers) are positively correlated with stronger IP rights,145
other studies specific to climate change technologies demonstrate that so far these
technologies have not been widely licensed to developing countries (even to those having
competitive markets). This may be due to IP ownership over those technologies in the
developed North or to other factors, such as the lack of scientific capability, adverse
market conditions, and poor investment climates in the developing South.146 Although
some studies have concluded that North–South licensing for climate change-related
technologies are no lower than for other technologies (while desires to transfer climate
change-related technologies are higher),147 other studies have concluded that climate
change mitigation technologies “are less likely to cross country borders than the average
technology,” are principally transferred among developed countries, and “seem to crowd
out local innovations.”148
Technology flows thus occur principally among developed countries (about seventy-
five percent of exported inventions) and are “almost non-existent” between emerging
countries.149 The general pattern of low levels of technology transfer from the developed
to the developing world is likely to remain stable for climate change technologies. Given
reliance on private markets and IP rights, these general patterns may skew even more
strongly against flows to and among developing countries, notwithstanding funding from
international agreements that could potentially change these patterns.
Moreover, the development and/or patenting of climate change technologies within
developing countries remains low. For example, one study finds that “less than 1% of
the world’s clean energy technology related patent applications from 1980 to 2009 have
been filed in Africa.”150 As noted in another study, the surveyed data “all suggest that
companies from developing countries are facing some difficulties in obtaining technolo-
gies, whether it is the high cost of licensing or having to obtain technologies from second-
tier technology holders,” that is, from companies other than leading manufacturers (who
are reluctant to license potential competitors).151 To enhance the dissemination of
144 See Hall & Helmers, supra note 14, at 7.
145 See, e.g., id. at 11; Lee Branstetter et al., Has the Shift to Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Promoted
Technology Transfer, FDI, and Industrial Development?, 2 W.I.P.O. J. 93, 96–98 (2010).
146 See, e.g., UNEP/EPO/ICTSD Study, supra note 62, at 58; Kaitlin Mara, New Climate Technologies
Rarely Reaching Developing Countries, Panel Says, IP Watch (Jul. 13, 2010).
147 See, e.g., UNEP/EPO/ICTSD Study, supra note 62, at 9, 58–59.
148 Dechezleprêtre 2008a, supra note 62, at 25.
149 See id. at 4.
150 EPO-UNEP, Patents and Clean Energy Technologies in Africa, Eur. Pat. Off., www.epo.org/news-
issues/technology/sustainable-technologies/clean-energy/patents-africa.html. The EPO has also a study on
Latin America reaching relatively similar conclusions. See Overview of the Latin American and Caribbean
Clean Energy Potential and Exploitation Levels, Eur. Pat. Off., http://documents.epo.org/projects/
babylon/eponet.nsf/0/2841b369787d5e72c1257da800335111/$FILE/patents_Latin_America_summary_
en.pdf.
151 UNEP/EPO/ICTSD Study, supra note 62, at 22–23.
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climate change-related technologies, developing nations are under pressure to reduce
tariffs. But such countries also may have been pressured to patent new technologies.
This may impose a “double penalty” of foreign competition on local technology devel-
opment (by lower import tariffs and domestic patenting of foreign technologies) that
might otherwise proceed at lower costs through (unpatented) imitation.152 In contrast,
local imitation may sometimes be difficult or may require significant adaptation to local
conditions.153
Developing countries, as well as developed countries and international agencies
funding such technology deployment and dissemination, may therefore be more likely
to challenge patent rights that prevent lower-cost production and acquisition of such
technologies. In turn, this raises the possibility of disputes under the TRIPS Agree-
ment154 and under international investment protection agreements.155 Alternatively,
climate change technology-rich countries may adopt explicit or implicit export subsidies
to facilitate technology transfers, which may generate additional trade disputes.156
The global imbalances in patenting noted earlier thus are also reflected in global
imbalances in licensing and technology transfers from the developed North to the
developing South. Even without regard to the dramatic geographical imbalances in
patenting and licensing behaviors, patented climate change technologies so far have
taken very long times to reach the mass market and to achieve widespread dissemi-
nation.157 As the recent effort to achieve a worldwide cell-phone standard has also
demonstrated, patent rights may delay or interfere with coordinated approaches to
achieve worldwide technology development and deployment.158 When technology has
been developed through R&D subsidies and transferred at low cost to developing
countries, its use still may require additional subsidies to overcome the sunk costs of
existing infrastructure or equipment, and local adaptation (or invention) may be needed
to provide sufficient comparative benefits to actual users, given that the technology needs
in developing countries may differ from those in developed countries.159 Thus, relying
on private markets and patents to distribute the needed technologies to the South may
prove both costly and less than optimally effective.
152 Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property and the Transfer of Green Technologies: An Essay on Economic
Perspectives, 1 W.I.P.O. J. 133, 137 (2009).
153 See Eur. Pat. Off., supra note 150, at 17.
154 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 133.
155 See, e.g., Canada NAFTA Decision, Case No. UNCT/14/2, final award, (Mar. 16, 2017), www.ippractice
.ca/blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Lilly-v-Canada-NAFTA-Arb-Award.pdf. See generally Hall & Hel-
mers, supra note 14; Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention on its
Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/14, at 156 (Nov. 20, 2009). See generally Lahra
Liberti, Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements (OECD, Working Paper
No. 2010/01, 2010); Bertram Boie, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights through Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Is there a TRIPS-plus Dimension? (NCRR Trade Regulation, Working Paper
No. 2010/19, Nov. 2010).
156 See, e.g., Thomas L. Brewer, The Trade Regime and the Climate Regime: Institutional Evolution and
Adaptation, 3 Climate Pol’y 329, 338 (2003).
157 See Lee, Iliev, & Preston, supra note 62, at vii; World Development Report 2010, supra note 45, at 293.
158 See, e.g., Branislav Hazucha, International Standards and Essential Patents: From Inter-
national Harmonization to Competition of Technologies, 27, 30 (2010).
159 See Hall & Helmers, supra note 14, at 4–6.
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B Innovation Policy Choices to Enhance Access and to Reduce Costs
of Intellectual Property Rights in Climate Change Technologies
Some of the proposed innovation policy choices discussed in this section are public
sector-based, some are private sector-based ownership controls,160 and some are a com-
bination of both. The first set of approaches focus on public sector laws and policies,
seeking to expand freedom-to-innovate and to develop local innovation capacity and
indigenous R&D within particular jurisdictions. They would do so by restricting the
definition of what can be patented and by authorizing certain experimental and other
uses of climate change-related technologies, so as to promote greater sequential innov-
ation and to assure functionality and development or regulatory information. The second
set of approaches focus on the private sector policies and choices (although they are
applicable to the public sector and PPP choices when acting as proprietors rather than
as regulators). They seek to leverage ownership powers to require licensing innovation
choices that better assure access to climate change-related technologies at reasonable
costs. The final set of approaches again focus principally on the public sector, and seek to
clarify when it will regulate private licensing of inventions deriving from government
subsidies and to better assure that climate change-related technology can be transferred
within the private sector from one jurisdiction to another.
These alternatives focus on achieving the greatest benefits for climate change innov-
ation, in both the developed and developing world, in ways generally recognized as
consistent with existing international IP treaty laws. They thus promise a greater likeli-
hood of being employed to develop the needed technologies, compared to more politic-
ally intractable treaty revisions, while controlling the costs of access and better assuring
transfer of the needed technologies.161
1 Protecting Basic Research and Sequential Innovation
The first set of innovation policy choices focuses on protecting basic research and
sequential innovation and use of technologies through governmental patent laws and
policies. The first measure would assure that significant additional creativity beyond basic
scientific discovery is needed for patent eligibility.162 This approach is based on adopting
160 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Opening Up The Patent System: Exclusionary And Diffusionary Levers In
Patent Law, 89 So. Calif. L. Rev. 793, 801, 820 (2016) (defining “Defensive patenting – holding patents
in order to facilitate freedom to operate – is practiced by an estimated half or more of patent holders” and
stating further that “[w]hile it often seems that there are only two approaches for supporting innovation
with patents – to opt-in and exclude, or to opt-out and share, intellectual property, a widely-used approach
between them is to acquire patents in order to share, or “defensive patenting. . . . It is widely recognized
that different industries use patents differently, and that patents support a diversity of business models.
Allowing innovators to individually tailor patent rights, and in some cases, to change these options over
the lifetime of the patent, would provide precise controls to those in the best position to know the optimal
balance between exclusion and diffusion with respect to a particular invention.”). See generally van
Overwalle, supra note 22.
161 Dominique Foray, Technology Transfer in the TRIPS Age: The Need for New Types of Partnerships
between the Least Developed and Most Advanced Economies, 38 (2009); Oliva, et al., supra note 15, at
5–7; Maskus & Okediji, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 15, at vii–viii, 26–7.
162 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, supra note *; Peter Lee,
Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to
Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech, 84 (2005).
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a restrictive interpretation of the meaning of “invention” as used in Article 27.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement.163 The second measure assumes that relevant climate change tech-
nologies exist under patent in a jurisdiction, and would encourage and (where needed)
expand robust legal exceptions to infringement liability for experimental uses, reverse
engineering, development of information for pre-market approval, and inter-operability.
This would permit scientific research and continued access to important technologies to
proceed unfettered by patent rights.164 These proposed measures remain consistent with
the permissive language for mandatory coverage of patents under Article 27.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement, as well as for exceptions and limitations to rights under Article 30 of
the TRIPS Agreement.165 They also would help to allow scientific knowledge to flow to
the developing South, and to permit downstream development and use of the creative
technologies that result, just as dependent patent licenses and “government use compul-
sory licenses”166 may sometimes be needed to assure the ability to operate, market access
and reasonable-cost technology transfer.
2 Expanding Ownership Controls over Downstream Licensing Mechanisms
The next two sets of innovation policy choices are particularly salient to PPPs because
they would originate principally from the private sector, although similar actions could
be taken by governments or PPPs when acting as proprietary owners of the relevant IP.
The purpose of these proposals would be to seek to assure that upstream owners of
patented climate change technologies retain various rights when licensing for commer-
cial development, so as to assure the potential for continued R&D and for widespread
and low-cost access. As Keith Maskus and Ruth Okediji have noted, contractual arrange-
ments “govern the majority of inter-firm and intra-firm transfers of knowledge and
technology in both domestic and international markets.”167 Thus these approaches exert
management-based (or private, market-driven) policy choices of innovation via owner-
ship controls.168
163 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 133, Art. 27.1.
164 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e); Merck KGAA v. Integra LifeSciences I Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202–08 (2005);
Agreement Relating to Community Patents, Dec. 15, 1989, art. 27; European Parliament and European
Council Directive 2004/27, art. 1.8(6), [2004] OJ L136/34 (EC) (amending Council Directive 2001/83
art. 10 (EC)); Carlos M. Correa,Multilateral Agreements and Policy Opportunities, Policy Dialogue 11
(2008); Frischmann, An Economic Theory, supra note107, at 995–97; Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm-Shifts,
and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 Yale L.J. 692–93 (2004); cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Recon-
sidering Experimental Use, Akron L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017). See generally Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra
note *.
165 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 133, Art. 30; Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharma-
ceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R, }} 7.54–7.57, 7.69 (adopted Apr. 7, 2000): Competition
& Tax Law, Declaration on the Three-Step Test, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property (2009),
www.ip.mpg.de; Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note *, at 175–79; Maskus & Okediji, Intellectual Property
Rights, supra note 15, at 32; Pamela Samuelson, Reverse Engineering Under Siege, Berkeley School of
Information 1–3.
166 Cf. Reichman, International Perspectives, supra note 131, at 139, 1140–41; Abdel-Latif, et al. supra note
29, at 30–31.
167 Maskus & Okediji, supra note 15, at 8.
168 Aseem Prakash, Greening the Firm: The Politics of Corporate Environmentalism 152 (2000)
(claiming that “firms adopt beyond-compliance [policy] initiatives primarily to preempt even more
stringent regulations or to shape future regulations.”); Overwalle, supra note 22; Chien, supra note 160.
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One set of ownership measures would be for upstream owners to retain the power to
authorize experimental uses (to the extent that any jurisdiction lacks such restrictions
on patent rights) and to permit “humanitarian” uses (at low or no cost) for climate
mitigation and adaptation needs.169 A second ownership measure would change the
default resort from exclusive to nonexclusive licensing (unless the former has been
demonstrated to be needed).170 Such measures would be adopted voluntarily by patent
owners in the first instance, and thus should encounter no legal concerns and should not
trigger inter-governmental retaliation. In contrast, new legal requirements (or at least
regulatory policy-based choices) may be needed for government agencies to condition
private ownership of government-funded inventions on the preservation of such retained
rights and default licensing policies.
Rather than for owners to start at the most restrictive level and for governments through
regulation to have to override such choices, the retained rights approach can start at the
most permissive level and ratchet up or differentiate restrictions if there are insufficient
grantees or licensees to accept the initially offered conditions. Nonexclusive licensing of
government-funded inventions thus could be required by law or regulatory policy as a
default, and appropriately differentiated in response to market conditions or unforeseen
circumstances. Such changes can be made much more quickly and more readily in
response to market conditions than trying to reverse the effects of broad initial grants
of rights for full patent terms through ex post regulatory measures and more formal
adjudications.
Related to this approach (and therefore it is not treated as a separate measure) would
be the greater use of patent holder and other IP rights-holder pledges, which could
include nonexclusive and reasonable cost licensing, as described in detail by Jorge
Contreras.171 Pledges are:
[public] commitments voluntarily made by patent holders to limit the enforcement
or other exploitation of their patents. These pledges encompass a wide range of tech-
nologies and firms: from promises by multinational corporations like IBM and Google
not to assert patents against open-source software users; to commitments by developers
of industry standards to grant licenses on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (FRAND); to the recent announcement by Tesla Motors that it will
169 See, e.g., Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law,
58 Emory L.J. 920–38 (2009); National Research Council, Managing University Intellectual Property in
the Public Interest, National Academies Press 7 (2010) (discussing (Mar. 6, 2007) In the Public Interest:
Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology), https://otl.stanford.edu/documents/white
paper-10.pdf); Paul A. David, Mitigating “Anticommons” Harms to Research, in Science and Technology:
New Moves in “Legal Jujitsu” against Unintended Adverse Consequences of the Exploitation of Intellectual
Property Rights on Results of Publicly and Privately Funded Research, 2 W.I.P.O. J. 59, 69 (2010); see
About Science Commons, Science Commons, http://sciencecommons.org/about; Alan B. Bennett,
Reservation of Rights for Humanitarian Uses, in Intellectual Property Management in Health
and Agriculture Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices 41 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007);
Carol Mimura, Technology Licensing for the Benefit of the Developing World: UC Berkeley’s Socially
Responsible Licensing Program, 21 J. Assoc. Univ. Tech. Managers, 15, 17–24 (2007).
170 See, e.g., Reichman, International Perspectives, supra note 131, at 1137; Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-
Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLoS Biol. 2080–81; see, e.g.,
Abdel-Latif, et al., supra note 29, at 15.
171 Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges: Between the Public Domain and Market Exclusivity, 2015 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 787.
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not enforce its substantial patent portfolio against any company making electric vehicles
in “good faith.”172
3 Leveraging Private Licensing and Technology Transfer Choices
through Government-Funding Regulatory Policies and International
Exhaustion Laws
The final two sets of innovation policy choices cut across public regulatory policies and
private sector ownership initiatives. The first set of measures would clarify “march in”
criteria under the US Bayh-Dole Act (or equivalent legislation in other jurisdictions),
where the government retains rights to assure the working of patents or the accessibility of
inventions created with government funds.173 The second set of measures would clarify
international “exhaustion” requirements to adopt permissive transfers without triggering
patent rights, at least within certain geographical regions or among countries having
similar levels of wealth or development.
March-in rights seek to facilitate access, but typically do so through cumbersome and
controversial administrative processes (subject to judicial review).174 Ex ante clarification
of the conditions on which march-in should occur would allow governments more
readily to march in when owners of patents funded with government money (or their
licensees) fail to make the technology sufficiently accessible at affordable costs. As with
conditions on licensees imposed through (private or government proprietary) ownership
powers or that are imposed by law (such as the earlier proposals for research and inter-
operability exceptions to infringement), government-imposed presumptions of march-in
conditions may have important signaling and demonstration effects, inducing private
commercial entities to adopt similar conditional, nonexclusive, and reasonable-cost
licensing policies.
Clarifying conditions for march-in ex ante should further reduce any concerns that
might arise from use of such governmental power. If march-in does occur, the gov-
ernment’s exercise of agreed-to conditions of the private party’s “title” should pose much
less concern for foreign direct investment or for other technology transfer mechanisms.
Certainly, march-in should then pose much less concern than ex post compulsory
licensing, price controls, or other ex post regulatory measures that governments inher-
ently retain.175 Governments, moreover, may retain “crown” rights or may otherwise
authorize governmental conduct that would be infringing, in order to perform research
or to produce patented products or provide patented services for public purposes.176
Further, march-in rights are not needed if nonexclusive, reasonable-cost licensing is
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., March-In Rights, 35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
174 SeeMarch-In Rights, 35 U.S.C. § 203(b); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 294 (2003).
175 Cf. Fair, supra note 141, at 37 (posing concerns over loss of foreign direct investment from compulsory
licensing).
176 See, e.g., Disposition of Rights, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4); Domestic and Foreign Proteciton of Federally
Owned Inventions, 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2); Sarnoff & Holman, supra note * (citing “Report of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), Working Group on Research Tools, App. D). The extent to which
the government can rely on private parties to assist in exercising such retained powers without triggering
infringement and required compensation – that may then be compensated under a “statutory takings”
provision such as provided in the United States at 18 U.S.C. § 1498 – may be uncertain.
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made a default condition for private parties to acquire title to rights in government-
funded, private inventions in the first instance.
The final proposed measure would make greater use of the so-called “exhaustion”
principle of patent law. Exhaustion permits parallel importation – importation of prod-
ucts produced and sold in other jurisdictions – and mandates unrestricted downsream
(from initial sale) use and resale of patented technologies. It is a rapidly developing area
of IP law and policy of increasing importance, and thus is treated at some length here.177
In theory, exhaustion should occur whenever patent owners or their licensees volun-
tarily supply a market, and thus obtain their “reward” through the first sale, even if the
product is sold at low cost. Given the patent-holder’s decision to itself make or otherwise
authorize such low-cost sales, parallel importation of such sold products can achieve
wider dissemination of climate change technologies that patent owners (or their licen-
sees) voluntarily bring to the market. Thus, the public sector policy may have a dramatic
effect on the private choices to transfer technologies across jurisdictions.
Given the global nature of the technologies and problems to be addressed, disputes
over patent exhaustion are very likely to arise in the climate change context.178 This
regulatory policy choice has taken on even more significance in light of the US Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Impression Products v. Lexmark, which announced a policy
of international exhaustion and automatic domestic exhaustion upon sale of patented
technologies (including patented components of products).179 The principle of “auto-
matic” exhaustion of patent rights and the inability to constrain reuse or resale of
patented products (and components) will dramatically affect the ability to engage in
restrictive licensing for particular markets and for price arbitrage across jurisdictions with
regard to mitigation and adaptation technologies (as well as for all other patented goods).
Accordingly, international exhaustion runs the risk of encouraging patent holders not to
sell to, or at prices that can be afforded by, some low-income jurisdictions.
Although the Impression Products opinion discussed preserving contract remedies to
enforce such contractual restrictions following sales (in dicta),180 it is possible that such
contract remedies may (in jurisdictions that recognize such principles) be considered
177 See generally Research Handbook On Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports
(Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2017).
178 See, e.g., Get Ready for the Clean Tech IP Boom, 182 Managing Intell. Prop., 44 (2008).
179 Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017). See, e.g., id. at 1534–35 (‘The
misstep in this logic is that the exhaustion doctrine is not a presumption about the authority that comes
along with a sale; it is instead a limit on “the scope of the patentee’s rights.’ . . . In sum, patent exhaustion is
uniform and automatic. Once a patentee decides to sell – whether on its own or through a licensee – that
sale exhausts its patent rights, regardless of any postsale restrictions the patentee purports to impose, either
directly or through a license.”); id. at 1536 (“Applying patent exhaustion to foreign sales is just as
straightforward. Patent exhaustion, too, has its roots in the antipathy toward restraints on alienation . . .
and nothing in the text or history of the Patent Act shows that Congress intended to confine that borderless
common law principle to domestic sales. In fact, Congress has not altered patent exhaustion at all; it
remains an unwritten limit on the scope of the patentee’s monopoly.”).
180 See id. at 1535, 1538 (“Once sold, the [patented products] passed outside of the patent monopoly, and
whatever rights Lexmark retained are a matter of the contracts with its purchasers, not the patent law. . . .
The purchasers might not comply with the restriction, but the only recourse for the licensee is through
contract law, just as if the patentee itself sold the item with a restriction. . . . Exhaustion does not arise
because of the parties’ expectations about how sales transfer patent rights. More is at stake when it comes
to patents than simply the dealings between the parties, which can be addressed through contract law.”).
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“preempted” by patent law. After all, it is only because of the “automatic” application of
the principle of “exhaustion” that there is no meaning or effect to be given (as a matter of
patent law and policy) to the contractual language that purports to restrict the transfer
of such “authority” upon the first “sale” (so as to prohibit downstream uses or resales).
And if this is so, it is hard to understand how enforcing such contractual provisions would
not conflict with the legislated (national) policy of exhaustion; those contractual provi-
sions would then permit the very same restrictions to be effectuated as a matter of (often
subsidiary jurisdiction) contract law remedies. The questions of exhaustion and preemp-
tion will take many years to resolve. Similarly, questions also will arise and take years
to resolve about whether such contractual restrictions on use and resale legally can be
imposed by “licensing” rather than by “selling” patented products to the public (likely by
combining such contract restrictions with mechanisms for “leasing” rather than “selling”
the products).181
These matters necessarily will be decided under national laws of particular jurisdic-
tions, raising potential conflicts of approach. This is because Article 6 of the TRIPS
Agreement precludes international regulation by the WTO of national policies to address
the exhaustion of patent rights and other IP rights, such as copyright.182 Thus, national
jurisdictions can adopt whatever approach they choose regarding the placing of goods
on (first) sale or in use, so long as national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment
principles are respected.183
Accordingly, nations will remain free to provide either or both international and
domestic exhaustion effect to patented goods sold in foreign and domestic markets. This
will permit low-cost resale and transfers from markets (or market segments) where patent
holders have voluntarily placed goods on sale.184 Correspondingly, to the extent that
national law limits international or domestic exhaustion, firms can implement contract-
ual policies that explicitly permit (as opposed to questionably prohibit) the same. Parallel
importation measures to promote access thus can cut across both public law frameworks
and private sector contractual arrangements.
In summary, these six sets of innovation policy choices collectively could help to
mitigate concerns that IP rights will adversely affect innovation and access, as well as
mitigate concerns for reducing ex ante investment and innovation incentives that inher-
ently attend ex post government regulation by compulsory licensing, price regulation, or
otherwise. Thus, these measures may help to accomplish the goals of promoting climate
change technology R&D and assuring widespread access to such technologies at reason-
able costs. Investors and inventors will know the limits of the patent rights, and can
decide in advance whether the rewards warrant the limitations and risks. These proposals
181 See generally Sean O’Connor,Origins of Patent Exhaustion: Jacksonian Politics, ‘Patent Farming,’ and the
Basis of the Bargain, University of Washington School of Law Research Paper No. 2017–05 (Mar. 8,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920738.
182 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (international exhaustion of copyrighted
works); Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l., Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017) (international exhaustion of
patented works).
183 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 133, Art. 6. (“For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement,
subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of
the exhaustion of IP rights.”).
184 See, e.g., Maskus, Parallel Imports, supra note 136, at 123–32.
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also would encourage investors and inventors to make extensive use of private mechan-
isms in order to facilitate access and technology transfer.185 Finally, greater use of these
measures could help to avoid national resort to some of the more controversial measures
that national governments retain under international IP and regulatory laws to assure
greater access to and to regulate prices of patented climate-change-related goods and
services.186 They may thereby reduce international and trade tensions, and simultan-
eously reduce pressures to alter the international IP regime.
Conclusion
Climate change not only imposes unequal impacts and obligations, but also will lead to
further unequal technology development and transfers, thereby imposing unequal costs
on those who must suffer the impacts or shoulder the obligations. These inequalities will
substantially impact the international regimes governing climate change, IP, and the
implementation of the SDGs. PPPs raise particular concerns regarding the distribution of
the benefits of the innovation policy choices that must be made when responding to
climate change.187 Institutional, network, and power effects may exacerbate existing
disparities of innovative activity, wealth, and power globally in ways that generate
additional global or domestic political tensions.
The turn to multi-stakeholder partnerships such as PPPs to implement international
development policy, including the SDGs, is based on the recognition that globalization
has already strained not only government efforts to develop human capital, but also the
managerial competencies of both government bureaucrats and firm decision makers.188
Whether in the public sector, the private sector, or PPPs, effective management of
complex inputs and networks requires information that is rarely available, predictive
judgments that are fallible, and skill sets that are in short supply.
In combatting climate change, greater reliance on PPPs must involve better evaluation
of the spectrum of possible innovation policy choices, to avoid wasting massive resources
and missing opportunities in the generation of desperately needed innovation outputs. At
a minimum, public sector involvement in PPPs should provide more innovation fund-
ing, policy-making, steering and operational control, and oversight, in order to induce
the market to supply additional funding.
185 See generally Chien, supra note 160.
186 See Sarnoff, Patent System, supra note *, at 333–60.
187 Powell, supra note 26, at 57–58 (“[S]cience policy is an effort to alter the trajectory, workings, and content
of the social system of science with the relatively weak lever of control over some, largely formal, aspects of
institutions. . . . [T]he institutional, network, and power mechanisms at work . . . have wider implications
for legitimacy claims, labor market processes, industrial clustering, and race/gender inequalities that span
many fields of science.”).
188 Rising to the Challenge: U.S. Innovation Policy for the Global Economy 53, 118–21 (Charles
W. Wessner & Alan W. Wolff eds., 2012) (discussing the need for human capital); Phillip Brown, Hugh
Lauder & David Ashton, Education, Globalization and the Future of the Knowledge Economy, 7 Eur.
Educ. Res. J. 131, 140 (2008) (“[V]irtually all [managers] we spoke to in China, Korea, India and
Singapore, as well as the United States, Germany and Britain, believed that they were in a war for talent,
which was increasingly global.”); see generally Deborah Agostino et al., Developing a Performance
Measurement System for Public Research Centers, 7 Int. J. of Bus. Sci. & Applied Mgmt. 43, 44–45
(2012) (discussing development of key performance indicators for performance management systems that
balance the information needs of different stakeholders).
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A more intentional approach to innovation management of PPPs also will require
better understanding and tracking of innovation funding and other resource inputs and
outputs, so as to better deploy the available innovation policies described here. In that
way, PPPs will be better able to maximize the benefits of technology transfer generated
through collaborative networks.
As stated in a recent summary of the conclusions of a World Bank Report, which
addressed historic failures to achieve SDGs in regard to water supply, sanitation, and
hygiene, achieving the SDGs will require changing innovation funding and technology
development practices.
[The report] suggests making three broad shifts to hasten implementation of the SDGs.
They include: [1] coordinating investments and interventions across sectors to improve
human development outcomes; [2] better targeting and efficiently allocating future
investments, given the limited fiscal space of most countries; and [3] gaining a better
understanding of the broader governance context within which [these] services are
delivered, to bridge gaps between policy and implementation.189
These recommendations are equally applicable to climate change. But we would add
two more recommendations (although the first is implicit in the World Bank’s recom-
mendations): [4] encouraging greater creativity and risk-taking in making innovation
policy choices that overcome historic and political inertia; and [5] placing a greater
emphasis on empathy and altruism, by rejecting the belief that climate change mitigation
and adaptation are “someone else’s problem.”
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